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Abstract. This article highlights certain recurring themes in Mariano Artigas’s works 
by examining a judicial decision made in the United States in 1982 concerning the 
teaching of “creation-science” alongside “evolution-science” in public schools. These 
themes include: the proper delimitation of the boundaries of science, the importance 
of philosophy as a bridge between science and religion, and the misunderstandings 
concerning the limits of science inherent in scientism.
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Introduction
Can a judge define what science is? Faced with a case in which he had to 
adjudicate whether creation science is science, U.S. District Court Judge 
William R. Overton was obliged to do just that. Obviously, as judge, Overton 
did not possess the requisite philosophical competence. However, he was able 
to listen to a host of prominent scientists speaking about their discipline. 
They were asked about the nature of their work: what is science, how it 
is done, and how it differs from religion. Consequently, Judge Overton’s 
Evolution in Court. A Federal Judge Defines Science
4(2)/2016398
M A R I E I . G E O RG E
ten-page decision1 includes accounts of the nature of both science and 
religion and their interrelation, accounts Mariano Artigas deemed worthy 
of investigation.2
Judge Overton’s ruling concerned a challenge to Act 590, which the 
Governor of Arkansas had signed into law in 1981, entitled “Balanced 
treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act.” Its essential 
mandate is stated in its first sentence: “Public schools within this State 
shall give balanced treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science” 
(Overton 1982, 934). Act 590 required that scientific evidence that supports 
the view that each species was created by God ex nihilo be provided alongside 
scientific evidence that supports evolution, i.e., the notion that new species 
arose from previously existing species.
Behind this “balanced treatment” is the idea that there is no way to 
accord the Biblical account of creation with evolution. But many people, 
scientists and religious believers alike, reject this view. In fact, the trial 
was named McLean versus the Arkansas Board of Education because the first 
name in the list of plaintiffs who objected to the Arkansas Act was Reverend 
Bill McLean, a Presbyterian minister. Various Christian churches were also 
included among the many plaintiffs.
In order to determine what science is, and how it differs from religion, 
Judge Overton had to hear the testimony of several qualified scientists, 
who acted in the capacity of expert witnesses. Among them were Francisco 
Ayala, professor of the University of California, and Stephen Jay Gould, 
a paleontologist of Harvard University, who was already well known as 
co-author (with Niles Eldredge) of the theory of punctuated equilibrium.
Act 590 relied upon quite elaborate definitions of “creation-science” and 
“evolution-science”—whence the need for expert witnesses in the McLean 
1 Overton’s decision, was favorably viewed by scientists, and was even reproduced in its en-
tirety in Science, the official magazine of the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science: “Creationism in Schools: The Decision in McLean versus the Arkansas Board 
of Education.” 
2 This article is drawn in part from what was to be the first chapter in a book that Dr. Artigas 
and I were collaborating on in 2004. The book, which was never completed, was tentatively 
entitled “Science and Religion: A Plea for Consonance.”
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trial. For example, the Act maintained that evolution-science typically 
affirms “the sufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about 
development of present living kinds from simple earlier kinds” (Overton 
1982, 937). The McLean sentence was able to reject this view relying on the 
expertise of Ayala and Gould, “both [of whom] stated that biologists know 
that these processes do not account for all significant evolutionary change. 
They testified to such phenomena as recombination, the founder effect, 
genetic drift and the theory of punctuated equilibrium, which are believed 
to play important evolutionary roles” (Overton 1982, 938).
Throughout Gould’s pre-trial deposition, the attorney representing the 
Arkansas board of education, David L. Williams, uses the typical tricks of the 
lawyer in hopes of taking Gould by surprise. His attempts to land Gould in 
a contradiction or to extract from him some concession to the creationists’ 
claim elicit from Gould some judicious answers to questions concerning 
science and religion. A case in point is when Williams interrogates Gould 
concerning the limits of science:
Q. Do you feel that we know all that there is to know about the natural law?
A. Goodness, if we knew everything that there was about the world I guess we 
would pack up and play golf for the rest of our lives.
Q. So there is more to learn?
A. By definition in science, there is always more to learn. What a dull world if 
there weren’t.
Q. Do you think that it would be scientific for a scientist to look at the origin 
of life or some organism and try to determine whether the origination of that 
life or organism was possible under the laws of nature?
A. Science, like any other enterprise, has boundaries. Science is that enterprise 
that attempts to describe and interpret the facts of the world under natural law, 
therefore attempts to study the origins of things under the laws of nature…
Q. So the study of the limits of the laws of nature would be part of science?
A. The limits are not—the limits are not—limits have to do more with definitions 
of the enterprise, not with the facts of nature. Therefore, nothing about morality 
is part of science. Natural law doesn’t deal with morality. But anything about 
the facts of nature come under the heading of natural law as we understand it.
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Q. What was the last statement? I didn’t hear it.
A. That the fact of nature as we understand it comes under the province of 
natural law.
Q. You use the term as we understand it.
A. Science is always tentative. (“Deposition of Dr. Stephen Jay Gould” 1981, 26)
Later in the deposition, Mr. Williams began to ask Gould about Karl Popper’s 
views:
Q. Are you aware that Popper in his autobiography, which is entitled “Unended 
Quest”, says, “I have come to the conclusion that Darwinism is not a testable 
scientific theory, but a metaphysical research program—a possible framework 
for testable scientific theories?”
A. Are you aware that he has modified that view since then?… That he now 
regards it as testable (“Deposition of Dr. Stephen Jay Gould” 1981, 43–44).
Williams knew that Karl Popper, one of the most influential philosophers of 
science in the 20th century, had expended a great deal of effort to determine 
what should qualify as science. Williams sought to exploit Popper’s highly 
controversial declarations on the scientific status of evolutionary theory 
as a means of eliciting from Gould a response that would aid the cause of 
creation-science.
Popper never proposed a full characterization of science, something 
which is a very difficult task. He concentrated on the minimum that we 
should require for something to qualify as science, and proposed falsifiability 
as the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science. A theory is 
to be considered scientific only if we can deduce from it some consequences 
that can be falsified, i.e. that may collide with empirical data. If we say, 
“It will rain here tomorrow,” we can wait and find out later whether this 
prediction was true or false. Therefore, this prediction is falsifiable, and 
could form part of a scientific theory. Pseudo-science, on the other hand, 
claims the status of science, but proposes theories that cannot be falsified.
Even though Popper was an agnostic, he did not deny the validity of 
metaphysics or religion as knowledge; he only argued that they are not a part 
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of empirical science. Falsifiability allowed Popper to distinguish empirical 
science from pseudo-science on the one hand, and from metaphysics on the 
other. He regarded the demarcation of science to be a central problem in 
the modern world, given the prestige of empirical science. His intent was to 
fight pseudo-science, not metaphysics or religion. Pseudo-science presents 
itself as science and does not meet the requirement of falsifiability, whereas 
metaphysics or religion does not usually claim the status of science, at least 
not in the sense of empirical science.
If a theory is falsifiable, it may end up being falsified. In that case it 
should be abandoned or, at least, modified. Popper concluded that there are 
no definitive conclusions in empirical science. Nothing is sacred. Everything 
should be open to criticism. Scientific knowledge is always provisional. 
It can always be rejected, modified, fine-tuned.
Even though many philosophers of science agreed with the above views, 
Popper is the one to be credited for putting these ideas in the limelight. 
Popper considered himself an agnostic and an evolutionist, and established 
a close parallel between his theory of knowledge and evolution. No wonder, 
then, that some people became confused and even alarmed when, in his 
autobiography published in 1974, he claimed that Darwinism was not 
falsifiable. This was not a remark made in passing; Popper developed this 
theme at length in a section entitled “Darwinism as a Metaphysical Research 
Programme:” “I have come to the conclusion that Darwinism is not a test-
able scientific theory, but a metaphysical research programme—a possible 
framework for testable scientific theories” (Popper 1993, 168).
This was the point that interested Mr. Williams. If no less an evolutionist 
and philosopher of science than Popper considered Darwinism to be meta-
physics, rather than science, this provided ammunition to the creationists, 
who tried by all means to discredit evolution’s status as science.
Popper continued to reflect on the status of Darwinism, and he eventu-
ally came to change his view. He openly recanted in the first Darwin lecture, 
delivered at Darwin College, Cambridge, on November 8, 1977. In the second 
section of the lecture, entitled “Natural Selection and its Scientific Status,” 
Popper says that: “Darwin’s own most important contribution to the theory 
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of evolution, his theory of natural selection, is difficult to test” (Popper 
1987, 143). And he comments that this has led some people to claim that 
Darwinism could be considered a tautology, even though, at the same time, 
it has great explanatory power, which seems a contradiction (Popper lists 
as proponents of this position great Darwinians, such as, Ronald Fisher, 
J. B. S. Haldane, and George Gaylord Simpson). His further remarks on the 
tautology issue lead into his retraction of the view that Darwinism is not 
falsifiable, and thus not science:
I mention this problem because I too belong among the culprits. Influenced by 
what these authorities say, I have in the past described the theory as “almost 
tautological”, and I have tried to explain how the theory of natural selection could 
be untestable (as is a tautology) and yet of great scientific interest. My solution 
was that the doctrine of natural selection is a most successful metaphysical 
research program. It raises detailed problems in many fields, and it tells us what 
we would expect of an acceptable solution of those problems.
I still believe that natural selection works in this way as a research program. 
Nevertheless, I have changed my mind about the testability and the logical 
status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad to have an opportunity 
to make a recantation. My recantation may, I hope, contribute a little to the 
understanding of the status of natural selection. (Popper 1987, 144)
The details concerning Popper’s change of view would carry us too far from 
our main point here,3 which is that it is not always easy to neatly determine 
what is testable and what is not testable, and therefore what belongs to the 
province of empirical science and what remains outside it. The latter explains 
3 To ascertain whether Popper was justified in changing his view on the falsifiability of nat-
ural selection, one would have to determine how Popper understood natural selection and 
whether his understanding was correct; and then one would have to examine his solution 
of the tautology problem (“organisms that survive are the fittest, while the fittest are the 
organisms that survive”). I note briefly that Popper maintained that natural selection was 
falsifiable because it was in fact falsified (as being universal) in cases of features aris-
ing from sexual selection, such as the male peacock’s tail. However, some maintain that 
sexual selection is a subcategory of nature selection, and some authors, unpersuaded by 
Popper’s defense of natural selection in face of the tautology problem, propose a different 
defense of it (see Stamos 1996, 170).
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why Mr. Williams could continue to press Gould on different aspects of the 
problem. Scientific theories often include concepts that can be empirically 
tested only in a very indirect way. Consider, for example, the principle of 
special relativity, which posits that all the laws of physics must have the 
same form when expressed in systems of reference that are inertial. In some 
way this expresses a fact of experience, namely, that we can walk on a ship 
as if we were on land (provided the ship’s movement is uniformly constant 
and along a straight line). But when we apply the principle to the laws of 
physics in general it leads to quite complex formulations that can only be 
tested very indirectly through some of their consequences.
1. A Definition of Science
Judge Overton did not let difficulties in the application of the criterion to 
be used to distinguish empirical science from other forms of knowledge 
prevent him from arriving at a definition of empirical science. After hearing 
a number of distinguished scientists, historians of science, philosophers of 
science, and theologians, Overton concluded that the essential character-
istics of science are:
(1) It is guided by natural law;
(2) It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law;
(3) It is testable against the empirical world;
(4) Its conclusions are tentative, i.e., are not necessarily the final word; and
(5) It is falsifiable. (Overton 1982, 938)
Characteristics (1) and (2) distinguish science from explanations which 
refer to a personal God who is the author of natural law. Characteristic 
(3) distinguishes science from philosophy as well as from religion, for 
although philosophy must take into account the empirical world, it, unlike 
science, produces explanations that are not testable against the empirical 
world through experiments. Characteristic (5) is a Popperian variant of (3). 
Characteristic (4) is a consequence of the empirical method of testing hy-
potheses against the empirical world; from a logical perspective, application 
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of this method will never result in a completely final answer. For this form 
of the hypothetical syllogism is invalid, i.e., its conclusion does not follow 
of necessity: “If A, then B; B, therefore A.” For, if B is shown to be true, it is 
not the case that A necessarily follows. For example, if it rains the ground is 
wet; but the fact the ground is wet does not prove that it has rained (some 
other cause may account for it, e.g., someone may have watered it). Yet this 
is the manner in which scientists reason: If hypothesis X is true, then such 
and such consequences will follow. Scientists then do repeated experiments 
to find out if such and such consequences do in fact follow. However, even if 
they do follow, the consequences do not prove that the hypothesis is true; 
given the logic of the situation, the most they can do is “corroborate” or 
strengthen the likelihood that the hypothesis is true.
To understand Overton’s application of the criteria for science to the 
Act we need to first look at the definitions that were used in the Act:
Creation-science includes the scientific evidences and related inferences that 
indicate: (1) Sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life from nothing; 
(2) The insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about the 
development of all living kinds from a single organism; (3) Changes only within 
fixed limits of originally created kinds of plants and animals; (4) Separate 
ancestry for man and apes; (5) Explanation of the earth’s geology by catastroph-
ism, including the occurrence of a worldwide flood; and (6) A relatively recent 
inception of the earth and living kinds. (Overton1982, 937)
Why did Overton, upon applying the above definition of science to crea-
tion-science as described above, conclude that it was not science? First of 
all, a sudden creation “from nothing” is not a scientific concept, “because 
it depends upon a supernatural intervention which is not guided by natural 
law” (Overton 1982, 938). This, of course, is a fair point.
Overton further concludes that creation science fails to qualify as science 
because, “it is not explanatory by reference to natural law, is not testable and 
is not falsifiable.” However, aside from the claim about creation ex nihilo, 
this statement is inaccurate. As noted above, the second claim about the 
sufficiency of mutation and natural selection has already been rejected on 
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scientific grounds. Also, one can look at fossil and other evidence to verify 
or falsify the limits of changes of organisms and whether humans have 
a separate ancestry from other organisms. Similarly, evidence is available 
to test geological hypotheses concerning the earth’s formation, as well as 
to test the reliability of different forms of dating. On these matters crea-
tion-scientists may be wrong, but they are doing science. In some cases, their 
objections to the theory of evolution are the same evidence-based objections 
that Darwin himself entertained, such as how the Cambrian explosion is 
compatible with the Darwinian theory.4 Such evidence-based objections 
are often swept under the carpet. But to insist that they be mentioned is 
simply to ask that science be properly taught. There is no need for some 
other form of science instruction.
Overton rightly observes that creation-science fails to meet the criterion 
of being tentative:
The methodology employed by creationists is another factor which is indicative 
that their work is not science. A scientific theory must be tentative and always 
subject to revision or abandonment in light of facts that are inconsistent with, 
or falsify, the theory. A theory that is by its own terms dogmatic, absolutist, 
and never subject to revision is not a scientific theory... The Court would never 
criticize or discredit any person’s testimony based on his or her religious beliefs. 
While anybody is free to approach a scientific inquiry in any fashion they choose, 
they cannot properly describe the methodology used as scientific, if they start 
with a conclusion and refuse to change it regardless of the evidence developed 
during the course of the investigation. (Overton 1982, 939)
Note, however, that this criticism cuts both ways: those arguing in favor 
evolution need to also consider the evidence against it, if they are doing 
science.
At this juncture it is pertinent to speak about a theme important in 
Artigas’s work, namely, the role of philosophy as a bridge between science 
4 See Darwin 1964, c. 10, “On the Imperfection of the Geological Record,” subsections, “On 
the sudden appearance of groups of species” and “On their sudden appearance in the 
lowest known fossiliferous strata.”
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and religion.5 Creation-science as defined above includes “scientific evidence 
and related inferences that indicate” creation ex nihilo. While it does not 
belong to science as such to address creation, the philosophical question 
of whether or not scientific knowledge has any bearing on this matter is 
never raised. Here is not the place to embark upon a full treatment of this 
question, though we can readily note that to the extent that scientific 
knowledge is tentative and subject to revision, it plainly is incapable of 
indicating anything further with certitude. However, neglect of this question 
and other related philosophical questions was at the root of the misguided 
efforts of the authors of Act 590. Rather than petitioning that students be 
taught “creation-science” in the biology classroom, the authors of Act 590 
would have done better to insist that students take a basic philosophy course 
in which they would receive instruction as to the relationship between 
science and religion. Such a course would clarify the limits of science. Such 
a course—assuming competent instructors—would make students aware that 
biology teachers have no business portraying scientific teachings concerning 
evolution as establishing that blind causes alone explain the diversity of 
life forms (thus undermining the notion of a creator God). In effect such 
teachers are using science as a platform on which to erect a materialist 
philosophy without actually addressing the philosophical issues involved.
Philosophy does not offer an entire solution to the atheism explicitly or 
implicitly disseminated by a certain number of biology teachers, however, 
insofar as scientific evidence that new species have originated from previ-
ously existing species is in conflict with the position that the apparition of 
all living species is ex nihilo.6 A “literalist” reading of Genesis concerning the 
5 See Artigas 2000, 12: “if I stress that a methodological gap exists between empirical sci-
ence and the questions about transcendence, I do not do so for my own convenience or to 
prevent the abuses of materialism and naturalism. The gap really exists. Since this is the 
case, to bridge it we will need to use intellectual tools, which must include elements com-
mon to the opposite sides of the bridge. This task cannot be accomplished by empirical 
science alone. I argue, instead, that it can be accomplished by philosophy.”
6 While space does not allow us to take up questions of the relationship between science 
and religion, I offer this text for reflection drawn from Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Prov-
identissimus Deus (1893). Leo XIII begins by quoting Aquinas: “When philosophers are 
agreed upon a point, and it is not contrary to our faith, it is safer, in my opinion, neither to 
4(2)/2016 407
E VO L U T I O N I N CO U RT. A F E D E RA L J U D G E D E F I N E S S C I E N C E
origin of all species is in fact incompatible with evolution. It is theology’s 
business to determine the manner in which scripture is to be interpreted.
2. The Conflict Thesis
Many people would be in overall agreement with Gould and Overton’s main 
views on science and creationism. But the McLean trial raises a very simple 
question: Why has it taken so long to understand that science and religion 
are two different domains? How did it come to such a strange impasse that 
a court judge was called upon to pronounce a verdict on this issue?
The truth is that portraying the relationship between science and religion 
as a perpetual conflict has been fashionable for a long time. Echoes of this 
idea can be found even in scientific publications that are usually objective. 
For instance, the column Skeptic in Scientific American (September 2004) is 
devoted to the difficult issue of body and soul, and there the contributing 
editor, Michael Shermer, writes: “Is scientific monism in conflict with reli-
gious dualism? Yes, it is. Either the soul survives death or it does not, and 
there is no scientific evidence that it does” (Shermer 2004, 24). But empirical 
science cannot say anything about spiritual realities, either pro or con.
Colin A. Russell, in a fine article on the conflict thesis, reminds us that 
the considerable literature on the subject commenced with two famous 
books published in the last decades of the nineteenth century: John William 
Draper’s History of the Conflict between Religion and Science (1874), and 
Andrew Dickson White’s A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in 
Christendom (1896). Both were repeatedly reprinted and widely circulated, 
apparently sometimes even in free versions paid for by people who intended 
lay down such a point as a dogma of faith, even though it is perhaps so presented by the 
philosophers, nor to reject it as against faith, lest we thus give to the wise of this world 
an occasion of despising the faith.” And continues: “The Catholic interpreter, although he 
should show that those facts of natural science which investigators affirm to be now quite 
certain are not contrary to the Scripture rightly explained, must, nevertheless, always 
bear in mind, that much which has been held and proved as certain has afterwards been 
called in question and rejected. And if writers on physics travel outside the boundaries of 
their own branch, and carry their erroneous teaching into the domain of philosophy, let 
them be handed over to the philosophers for refutation” (no. 19).
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to enlighten the ignorant. As a result: “For nearly a century, the notion of 
mutual hostility (the Draper-White thesis) has been routinely employed in 
popular-science writing, by the media, and in a few older histories of science. 
Deeply embedded in the culture of the West, it has been proven extremely 
hard to dislodge” (Russell 2002, 4).
According to Russell, “the conflict thesis, at least in its simple form, is 
now widely perceived as a wholly inadequate framework within which to 
construct a sensitive and realistic historiography of Western science” (Russell 
2002, 5). There are at least six notable deficiencies in the conflict thesis:
The shortcomings of the conflict thesis arise from a multiplicity of reasons, 
some of which can be briefly summarized as follows. First, the conflict thesis 
hinders the recognition of other relationships between science and religion. At 
different phases of their history, science and religion were not so much at war 
as largely independent, mutually encouraging, or even symbiotic…
Second, and more specific, the conflict thesis ignores the many documented 
examples of science and religion operating in close alliance…
Third, the conflict thesis enshrines a flawed view of history in which 
“progress” or (in this case) “victory” has been portrayed as inevitable…
Fourth, the conflict thesis obscures the rich diversity of ideas in both science 
and religion. Neither of these has ever been monolithic, and there was seldom 
a unified reaction from either…
Fifth, the conflict thesis engenders a distorted view of disputes resulting 
from causes other than those of religion versus science…
Finally, the conflict thesis exalts minor squabbles, or even differences of 
opinion, to the status of major conflicts. (Russell 2002, 7–9)
Another contemporary author critical of the conflict thesis, David B. Wil-
son, examines it from the perspective of the historiography of science and 
religion. Wilson shows, for instance, that this thesis was completely absent 
in the work of William Whewell (1794–1866). Whewell was the most prom-
inent historian of science during the first half of the nineteenth century, in 
addition to being a philosopher of science, a mathematical physicist, and 
an Anglican clergyman.
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Earlier authors of note who criticized the conflict thesis include 
E. A. Burtt in Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (1924), and 
Alfred North Whitehead in Science and the Modern World (1926). However, 
the Draper-White thesis found an echo in other authors. And then events, 
such as the Scopes trial, took place that lent themselves to being interpreted 
as additional episodes in the series of confrontations between science and 
religion. Ultimately, “despite the growing number of scholarly modifications 
and rejections of the conflict model from the 1950s on, the Draper-White 
thesis proved to be tenacious… At any rate, in the 1970s leading historians 
of the nineteenth century still felt required to attack it” (Wilson 2002, 21).
3. The Complexity Thesis
In recent times, as Wilson notes, the “complexity thesis” has gained ground. 
This thesis maintains that science and religion are closely intertwined, and 
that circumstances of a social and political kind must often be taken into 
account in order to correctly understand the relationship between the two. 7 
Two books of note in this line are God and Nature, a collective work edited by 
David Limberg and Ronald Numbers, and Science and Religion by John Hedley 
Brooke, first holder of the chair of Science and Religion at the University 
of Oxford. Brooke explains the complexity thesis, which he illustrates with 
many particular examples throughout his book, thus:
7 One definition of religion is “a set of beliefs, derived from divine revelation, concern-
ing God and what we must do to please him,” but there are others as well. Some of the 
more recent books on the relationship between science and religion try to reframe the 
discussion in light of alternate definitions of religion. Matthew Stanley largely equates 
religion with theism in Huxley’s Church and Maxwell’s Demon: From Theistic Science to 
Naturalistic Science. Peter Harrison in The Territories of Science and Religion proposes to 
“describe how it is that we have come to understand the world in terms of these distinct 
categories ‘science’ and ‘religion’—how, in other words, we have come to separate the do-
main of material facts from the realm of moral and religious values” (Harrison 2015, xx). 
Harrison maintains that religion has been understood in different ways throughout the 
ages. Plainly, different understandings of what religion is are apt to result in different 
understandings of how it relates to science.
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Serious scholarship in the history of science has revealed so extraordinarily rich 
and complex a relationship between science and religion in the past that general 
theses are difficult to sustain. The real lesson turns out to be the complexity. 
Members of the Christian churches have not all been obscurantists; many 
scientists of stature have professed a religious faith, even if their theology was 
sometimes suspect. Conflicts allegedly between science and religion may turn out 
to be between rival scientific interests, or conversely between rival theological 
factions. Issues of political power, social prestige, and intellectual authority 
have repeatedly been at stake. And the histories written by protagonists have 
reflected their own preoccupations. (Brooke 1991, 5)
4. The absence of proper philosophical analyses  
keep the conflict thesis alive
This is not to say that the conflict thesis has been completely defeated. It 
will probably always have defenders. In our day, one of the most prominent 
advocates of the irreconcilable differences between science and religion is 
the ethologist Richard Dawkins, first occupant of the Charles Simonyi chair 
for the Public Understanding of Science at the University of Oxford. On 
the occasion of a conciliatory statement on evolution made by Pope John 
Paul II in 1996, Dawkins criticized Gould’s attempt to reconcile science 
and religion by relegating factual claims to science and ethical claims to 
religion. Dawkins’ main argument is that religion, and more specifically 
Catholicism, “make existence claims, and this means scientific claims” 
(Dawkins 2003, 208).
The first example Dawkins gives to support his thesis is the Catholic 
doctrine that God directly intervenes to create a human soul for each human 
being, a teaching which amounts to claiming that there is a gulf between 
Homo sapiens and the rest of the animal kingdom. Dawkins takes the position 
that: “Such a gulf is fundamentally antievolutionary. The sudden injection 
of an immortal soul in the time line is an antievolutionary intrusion into the 
domain of science.” As for major doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, 
such as the Virgin birth, the bodily Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, 
the Resurrection of Jesus, Dawkins asserts that: “These are all claims of 
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a clearly scientific nature… So is the theory that our souls survive bodily 
death and so are all the stories of angelic visitations, Marian manifestations, 
and miracles of all types” (Dawkins 2003, 208–209). Dawkins goes on to 
conclude that:
There is something dishonestly self-serving in the tactic of claiming that all 
religious beliefs are outside the domain of science. On the one hand miracle 
stories and the promise of life after death are used to impress simple people, 
win converts, and swell congregations. It is precisely their scientific power that 
gives these stories their popular appeal. But at the same time it is considered 
below the belt to subject the same stories to the ordinary rigors of scientific 
criticism: these are religious matters and therefore outside the domain of 
science. But you cannot have it both ways. (Dawkins 2003, 209)
As a matter of fact, the Catholic Church has taught all the doctrines men-
tioned by Dawkins many centuries before modern empirical science was 
born. Therefore, it is difficult to understand how they could derive their 
appeal from “their scientific power,” or why Dawkins says that “these are all 
claims of a clearly scientific nature.” The explanation may lie in an implicit 
assumption on Dawkins’ part that there cannot be any reality apart from 
the reality studied by science, nor any valid knowledge apart from scientific 
knowledge. But this assumption cannot be considered science. It is a well-
known philosophical thesis that usually goes by the name of scientism.
5. Science and Scientism
There are many varieties of scientism, and whole books on the subject. In 
its most general form, scientism is the idea that scientific knowledge is the 
only valid kind of knowledge, or at least that any other knowledge claims 
should follow, or try to imitate, the methods of science. The problem is that 
scientism itself does not meet this requirement. It is neither science nor 
even a consequence of science. Therefore, scientism is self-defeating. This 
philosophical position generally stems from giving exaggerated importance 
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to the methods and achievements of science, while depreciating the value 
of other realms of knowledge.8
Specific forms of scientism usually highlight one particular science 
as the key to all the rest. For instance, physicalism presents physics as the 
source of all the sciences, and of all knowledge in general. In the 1930’s, 
some members of the Vienna Circle promoted this view.9 Not only did they 
maintain that all scientific propositions should be derived from physics, 
and in the final analysis from sensory experiences, they maintained that 
all knowledge should be “reduced” to physics. Not surprisingly the differ-
ent attempts to work out this idea failed. During the 1990s a new kind of 
non-reductive physicalism became popular among some philosophers who 
found in this formulation a way of disavowing reductionism, while at the 
same time admitting some kind of materialism. But views such as these 
cannot be considered scientific. Empirical science deals with matter, but 
we cannot conclude from this that only matter exists.
Dawkins would be right if he only meant that many mysteries and 
miracles in Christianity imply empirical claims. Miracles are facts that 
presumably do not follow natural law. However, if one admits that God exists, 
and that He is the First Cause of all that exists, then there is no difficulty in 
admitting that He is the author of the natural laws, and that, if He wishes 
to do so, He can act to suspend those laws.
Without doubt, empirical science presupposes that there exists a natural 
order governed by natural law. This assumption, contrary to what Dawkins 
would have one believe, is closely connected with the Christian notions of 
an infinitely wise and powerful God as the First Cause of an ordered world, 
and of the human being created in God’s likeness, with the ability to know 
the order of the natural world. These Christian views were embraced by the 
8 Artigas points out the patent deficiencies of scientism in many of his works, for example: 
“The claim that there is no valuable knowledge outside science certainly cannot be sup-
ported from within science. This is an extremely simple philosophical error, akin to a child 
claiming that because all the people he knows are in his house, that there cannot be peo-
ple outside his house. When we reflect on science—its aims, its values, its limits—we are 
doing philosophy, not science” (Artigas 2007, 40). See also, Artigas 2006, 196–199.
9 In (2006, 30–35) Artigas discusses the influence of the Vienna Circle at length.
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vast majority of the pioneers of modern empirical science in the seventeenth 
century: Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and many others. From a Christian per-
spective, God’s activity in the world is not limited to particular punctual 
interventions. God acts continually on everything, as everything depends 
on Him as the First Cause of all being. Usually He acts on the natural world 
following the laws that He himself has impressed on it. But there is no 
difficulty in admitting that sometimes He can act otherwise, and we call 
this a miracle.
The Christian position on the spiritual nature of the human soul also 
does not conflict with any methodological principle or conclusion of science. 
Science cannot tell us one way or the other whether each human individual is 
in fact a single being that possesses both material and spiritual dimensions. 
For if spiritual realities exist, they cannot be the subject of empirical science, 
which considers only those theories that can be submitted to empirical 
control by repeatable experiments. Here again we see the crucial need for 
philosophical reflection which does not proceed by way of experiment, 
but rather reasons from common experience to address certain questions 
science cannot address, such as what human intelligence consists is and 
whether some part of the human being continues in existence after death.
Scientism simplifies the world and our arguments, at the price of leaving 
aside dimensions of reality that must be taken into account if we are to 
provide a more complete explanation of it. Simplifying is a good method for 
studying particular issues. But a good simplification never forgets what it 
has left aside. If there are human dimensions that have a spiritual character, 
we should not try to explain them away. We should admit their reality, and 
try to understand them using methods commensurate with their nature.
Conclusion
“Evolution does not presuppose the absence of a creator or God,” said 
Judge Overton in his sentence. For the same reasons, we may say more 
generally, “Empirical science does not presuppose the absence of a creator 
or God.” The conflict thesis is untenable. At the very same moment that one 
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begins to argue that empirical science is not compatible with spirituality 
and therefore with religion, one must face the inescapable contradictions 
that scientism, in its different varieties, is bound to produce. If the authors 
of Act 590 had recognized the rightful place of philosophy in discussions 
concerning science and religion, not only would they have never embarked 
on their misguided attempt to pass off religion as science, they would also 
have realized that a better tack to circumvent the attempts by certain science 
teachers to foist atheism on students under the pretext of teaching them 
evolutionary science is to introduce into schools some basic philosophical 
instruction as to what constitutes science and what are the limits of science 
and of religion. Again, although this would not entirely dispel the tension 
between science and religion, as the theological issue of the correct manner 
of interpreting scripture would remain, it would have helped many students 
recognize the needlessness of opposing the two domains.
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